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JUDICIAL AUTHORITY IN THE SETTLEMENT
OF FEDERAL CIVIL CASES
In the past few decades, the role of the federal district court judge has
evolved from that of a reticent dispenser of justice merely presiding over trial
proceedings to one of an active case manager involved in the formulation and
direction of civil litigation.' An ever-increasing caseload, coupled with more
complex litigation, has served as a catalyst for this evolution.2 The growth
in litigation is especially noticeable in federal district courts, where in the last
fifteen years the number of cases filed has more than doubled and the number
of trials lasting more than one month has more than tripled.3 The expanding
role of the federal district judge has elicited debate regarding the authority
of the trial judge to control the preparation and presentation of civil cases
tried before him.4
1. See Kozinski, Ten Principles for the New Federal Practice, 31 FED. BAR & NEWS J.
16, 16 (1984) (description of transformation from feudal justice to modern justice). In thirteenth
century England, the King served as trial court judge. Id. Plaintiffs and defendants would make
their pleas to the King under an oak tree and the King swiftly would render his decision. Id.
Although the early American federal court system involved a slightly more complex procedure,
modern pretrial procedure did not surface until the advent of compulsory pretrial conferences
in 1929. See Oesterle, Trial Judges in Settlement Discussions: Mediators or Hagglers?, 9 CORNELL
L. FoRuM 7, 7 (1982) (discussion of history of settlement conferences) [hereinafter cited as Osterlel.
In that year, the Circuit Court of Wayne County, Michigan had a backlog of forty-five months.
Id. In an effort to alleviate this problem, the court introduced a system of mandatory pretrial
conferences in which discussion of settlement was a principal issue. Id. The system succeeded
in reducing the waiting time for trial from twelve to fifteen months. Id. Other courts in large
cities soon adopted similar systems. Id.
In 1938, rule 16 of the newly enacted Federal Rules of Civil Procedure established a system
of federal pretrial procedure. Id.; see FED. R. Civ. P. 16 (rule establishing pretrial conference
and pretrial order); see also infra notes 31-38 and accompanying text (discussion of role of rule
16 in settlement conferences). Although rule 16 did not mention settlement discussions as a part
of pretrial procedure, the rule nevertheless established the groundwork for an increased judicial
role in case management. See FED. R. CIv. P. 16.
2. Peckham, The Federal Judge as a Case Manager: The New Role in Guiding a Case
from Filing to Disposition, 69 CALiF. L. Rav. 770, 770 (1981) (discussion of impact of increased
caseload on judicial management).
3. Id.
4. See generally Oesterle, supra note 1, at 7 (discussion of contrasting views between those
who encourage court to take active role in trial preparation and those who advocate separation
of judge from pretrial proceedings). A judge's role in settlement negotiations is in some ways
analogous to the judge's role in criminal plea bargain negotiations. See Frank v. Blackburn, 646
F.2d 873, 894 (5th Cir. 1980) (Hill, J., dissenting), cert. denied 454 U.S. 840 (1981). In Frank
v. Blackburn, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit stated that while federal
courts must insure the voluntariness of a defendant's guilty plea, the judge may not actively
negotiate that plea. 646 F.2d at 880. In his dissent in Frank, Judge Hill described the similarities
between civil and criminal settlement negotiations. Id. at 894-95. In both civil and criminal cases,
the offended party first states an ad damnum or claim of injury. Id. at 895. The offended party
does not expect to receive his full claim for damages, but the defendant is not certain that the
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One method of control that reduces the federal district judge's caseload
is judicial participation in settlement negotiations.5 A settlement is an out-of-
court agreement in which a party withdraws pending litigation from the court
in exchange for a compromise with the other party.' The American judicial
system favors such settlements as a means of resolving disputes between parties.
However, because judicial participation in settlement negotiations constitutes
a form of judicial control in the preparation and presentation of civil cases,
offended party will not receive his full claim. Id. The defendant's uncertainty motivates the defendant
to bargain for a reduced penalty. Id. At settlement, the defendant in both civil and criminal
cases is willing to admit liability, but only when the other party agrees to place limitations on
that liability. Id. Thus, through negotiation, both civil and criminal actions utilize the adversary
nature of the American judicial system to achieve a just result. See id. at 901; Frank v. Blackburn,
646 F.2d 902, 904 (5th Cir. 1981) (Hill, J., dissenting), cert. denied 454 U.S. 840 (1981).
In contrast to the view that civil and criminal settlements are similar, Judge Rubin, in
a separate dissent in Frank, pointed out distinctions between the two systems. See Frank v.
Blackburn, 646 F.2d 873, 901- (5th Cir. 1980) (Rubin, J., dissenting). Plea bargaining involves
an admission of guilt and a compromise of an individual's liberty. Id. While both civil and criminal
settlements are negotiated, the societal and individual stakes and interests are different. Id.
Based on the desire of the framers of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure to limit
the authority of judges in criminal settlement negotiations, rule l1(e)(l) of the Federal Rules
of Criminal Procedure has banned the trial judge's participation in plea bargaining. See FED.
R. CRnm. P. 1 l(e)(1). Rule ll(e)(1) states in part that although the prosecutor and the defendant
may engage in plea bargaining, the court should not take part in the plea bargain negotiations.
Id. In citing support for the rule, Professor Albert W. Alschuler states several reasons for the
ban on judicial participation in plea bargaining. See Alschuler, The Trial Judge's Role in Plea
Bargaining, Part I, 76 COLUM. L. REv. 1059, 1104-20 (1976) (discussion of rationale underlying
rule 11). First, while attorneys may advise the defendant to accept a plea bargain, a judge giving
the same advice will appear to be giving his "best offer" and, in effect, force the defendant
to accept the bargain or face a potentially longer sentence. Id. at 1104-05. Another concern is
that a judge who has participated in negotiations may be unable to conduct a fair trial if the
defendant refuses the offer. Id. at 1108. Since the judge knows background facts and testimony,
his exposure provides enough information to tempt him to "prejudge the case". Id. Finally,
some scholars have argued that plea bargaining is beneath the judge's dignity and creates bad
perceptions of the judicial office. Id. at 1119-20.
Several cases have delineated the boundaries for judicial involvement in criminal plea bargain-
ing. In United States v. Werker, the government petitioned the United States Court of Appeals
for the Second Circuit for a writ of mandamus to prohibit a trial judge from disclosing the sentence
he would impose if the defendant pleaded guilty. 535 F.2d 198, 205 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 429
U.S. 926 (1976). The Second Circuit issued the writ, holding that a trial judge should refrain
completely from speaking with the defendant about possible plea bargains. Id. In addition, in
United States v. Adams, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit held that since
the trial judge had participated in plea bargaining, the defendant was entitled to a new sentencing
hearing when the defendant pleaded not guilty and later was convicted. 634 F.2d 830, 832 (5th
Cir. 1981). In so holding, the Fifth Circuit stated that rule I l(e) of the Federal Rules of Criminal
Procedure served as an absolute ban on judicial involvement in plea bargaining. Id. at 835.
5. See Wall and Schiller, Judicial Involvement in Pre-Trial Settlement: A Judge is Not
a Bump on a Log, 6 AM. J. TR.AL ADvoc. 27, 28 (1982) (description of role of settlement in
reducing judicial caseload) [hereinafter cited as Wall and Schiller].
6. BLAcK's LAW DICTIONARY 993 (5th ed. 1979) (definition of out-of-court settlement).
7. See Wall and Schiller, supra note 5, at 29 (settlement is favored means of dispute resolu-
tion). Consistent with the notion of settlement as a favored means of dispute resolution, rule
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the notion of judicially encouraged settlements has evoked mild controversy.8
Nebraska Public Power District v. Austin Power, Inc. represents a recent
example of the controversy surrounding the judge's role in the settlement
process. 9 Austin Power involved a claim and counterclaim for breach of con-
tract in the construction of an electric power plant.'" In a pretrial order, the
district judge for the United States District Court for the Nebraska District
required the attendance of the boards of directors of both parties during the
trial proceedings." The judge based the order on the need for the presence
of those individuals who were most capable of resolving the dispute. 2 The
court reasoned that only by their physical presence could the boards
continuously re-evaluate their case and insure proper disposal of the
proceedings.3
408 of the Federal Rules of Evidence attempts to increase the possibility of out-of-court settle-
ment. See FED. R. EvID. 408. Rule 408 states that evidence of previous settlement negotiations
or offers is inadmissible at trial. Id. The purpose of rule 408 is to encourage the settlement of
cases before trial. See McHann v. Firestone Tire and Rubber Co., 713 F.2d 161, 166-67 (5th
Cir. 1983) (discussion of purpose of rule 408); Zenith Radio Corp. v. Matushita Elec. Indus.
Co., Ltd., 505 F. Supp. 1125, 1183 (E.D. Pa. 1980) (discussion of purpose of rule 408). If the
trial court admitted evidence of settlement offers in court, attorneys would be unwilling to speak
with each other out of fear that such communications would surface at trial. See 2 D. LOuiSELL
& C. MUELLER, FEDERAL EVIDENCE 272 (1978) (discussion of attorney's reliance on exclusion
of settlement offers as evidence).
While rule 408 does not affect directly a judge's role in pretrial negotiations, the rule
nonetheless reflects a general policy that American jurisprudence seeks to encourage settlement
of civil actions. See Advisory Committee's Note, FED. R. EvID. 408. Similarly, rule 68 of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure states that any party may offer to have a judgment entered
against him, and if the opposing party does not accept the offer, evidence of the offer is inad-
missible in determining liability. FED. R. CIrv. P. 68. Like rule 408, the purpose of rule 68 is
to encourage settlement. See 7 J. MooRE & J. LuCAS, MooRE's FEDERAL PRACcE 68.02 (2d
ed. 1984).
8. See supra note 4 (description of controversy over judicial activism).
9. Nebraska Pub. Power Dist. v. Austin Power, Inc. No. 83-2702, slip op. (8th Cir. Jan.
II, 1984) (per curiam).
10. See Appellant's Brief at 2, Nebraska Pub. Power Dist. v. Austin Power, Inc., No.
83-2702, slip op. (8th Cir. Jan. 11, 1984) [hereinafter cited as Appellant's Brief]; Appellee's Brief
at 2, Nebraska Pub. Power Dist. v. Austin Power, Inc., No. 83-2702, slip op. (8th Cir. Jan.
11, 1984) [hereinafter cited as Appellee's Brief]. In Nebraska Public Power District v. Austin
Power, Inc., Nebraska Public Power District (N.P.P.D.) had contracted with Austin Power, Inc.
to construct a 650 megawatt, coal -fired power plant near Sutherland, Nebraska. See Appellee's
Brief at 2. During the four years in which the plant was under construction, the project experienced
cost overruns and delays. Id. Each of the parties to the lawsuit placed blame for the overruns
on the other party. Id.
11. See Memorandum and Amendatory Order at 3, Nebraska Pub. Power Dist. v. Austin
Power, Inc., CV80-L-56 (Neb. Dist. Dec. 23, 1983) (order requiring attendance of boards of
directors).
12. Id. at 2.
13. Id.; see also Memorandum and Order at 2, Nebraska Pub. Power Dist. v. Austin Power,
Inc. CV80-L-56 (Neb. Dist. Dec. 16, 1983). While the district court in Austin Power stated that
it had no interest in forcing a settlement, the court alluded to its busy docket and the expenditure
of time by the judge, jury, and staff. See Memorandum and Order at 2, Nebraska Pub. Power
Dist. v. Austin Power, Inc. CV80-L-56 (Neb. Dist. Dec. 16, 1983). The court further stated that
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On appeal of the pretrial order, Nebraska Public Power District (N.P.P.D.)
argued that such an order amounted to an attempt by the judiciary to coerce
settlement, and therefore constituted an abuse of discretion. 4 The United States
Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit agreed and reversed the trial judge's
pretrial order." Nevertheless, because of the complexity of the case, the Eighth
Circuit allowed the lower court to require the attendance of one member of
N.P.P.D.'s board of directors and one of its senior management officials.' 6
The Austin Power court, however, neglected to comment on their rationale
for modifying the order of the trial judge.1
7
While the Eighth Circuit in Austin Power ignored the opportunity to discuss
the basis for a trial court's power to promote settlement, an analysis of federal
court decisions and academic commentary suggests that the federal judiciary
derives such power from several sources. Among the sources of a court's power
to promote settlement are rules 1, 16, and 83 of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure. 8 Rule 1 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides the
broadest authority over trial procedure granted to the federal district courts.' 9
Rule 1 states that courts should construe liberally the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure to achieve the "just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every
action." ' 20 The language of rule 1 reflects the notion that placing rigid restric-
tions on the procedural powers of a federal district court would hamper the
court's efforts to achieve a just resolution of cases brought before it."' Instead,
a failure to settle would leave the question of liability to a judge and jury, and thus create an
all-or-nothing proposition for the parties. Id. at 1. However, the language of the court's memoran-
dum indicated that the judge appeared to be attempting to compel a settlement. See Appellant's
Brief at 26.
14. Appellant's Brief at 25-26.
15. Nebraska Pub. Power Dist. v. Austin Power, Inc., No. 83-2702, slip op. (8th Cir. Jan.
11, 1984) (per curiam).
16. Id. at 2. The public had an interest in the outcome of the Austin Power case because
N.P.P.D. constituted a quasi-governmental body with publicly elected directors. Id. Because of
this public interest, the Austin Power court reasoned that a representative from the N.P.P.D.
board of directors should be present during trial. Id. The actual Eighth Circuit order requiring
attendance of the board affected only a member of N.P.P.D. Id. Presumably, the order did
not affect Austin Power because Austin Power did not appeal the order. See generally Appellee's
Brief. Rather, Austin Power supported the trial court's order requiring attendance of both parties.
Id.
17. See generally Austin Power, No. 83-2702, slip op. (court fails to explain reason for
modification of pretrial order).
18. See Fox, Settlement: Helping the Lawyers to Fulfill Their Responsibility, 53 F.R.D.
129, 131 (1971) (rules 1, 16, and 83 of Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provide basis of district
court judge's authority to require parties to attempt to reach settlement).
19. Id. (rule 1 is "polestar" of Federal Rules of Civil Procedure).
20. FED. R. Civ. P. 1.
21. See C. WRIOHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE, § 1029 (1969)
[hereinafter cited as Wgiuom & MILLER]. The import of rule 1 is that courts should resolve cases
on the merits rather than on the basis of technicalities. Id. Courts must give the rules liberal
construction to further the cause of justice. Id.
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the law affords the trial court judge a broad range of discretion based upon
the facts of each particular case.22
Balanced against the broad discretion granted under rule 1 is the counter-
vailing consideration that a trial judge must exercise his discretion wisely.
23
A trial judge may not ignore the context of a procedural rule or refuse to
apply a procedural rule without considering the general principles expressed
in rule 1.2' Thus, while the trial judge has the freedom to construe the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure liberally, a liberal construction that ignores the impact
of the judge's decision on justice, speed, or efficiency is as improper as an
unnecessarily strict interpretation of procedural requirements. 2
In the context of a trial judge's role in encouraging settlement, the judge
should feel comfortable in experimenting with novel ways of uniting the par-
ties for settlement negotiations. 26 Early settlement of a case would further the
goal of achieving a speedy and inexpensive determination of the subject
matter.2 7 However, the judge must realize that the goal of justice is as impor-
tant as the goal of a speedy and inexpensive resolution of the case .2 In Austin
Power, the Eighth Circuit could have reasoned that the trial judge had sacrificed
"justice" in favor of "speed" and "efficiency. ' 29 In so doing, the trial court
22. See Skogen v. Dow Chemical Co., 375 F.2d 692, 704 (8th Cir. 1967). The United States
Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit in Skogen v. Dow Chemical Co. held that the trial court's
refusal to allow a witness to answer certain questions did not deprive plaintiffs of their right
to cross-examine witnesses. Id. In upholding the trial court's action, the Eighth Circuit stated
that since a trial judge has great responsibility for conducting trial, the judge must possess a
broad degree of discretion in procedural matters. Id. Similarly in Herbert v. Lando, the Utitied
States Supreme Court held that all Federal Rules of Civil Procedure operated under the maxim
of rule 1, which insures the "just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every action." 441
U.S. 153, 177 (1978). In Herbert, the plaintiff brought a libel action in which the plaintiff sought
to discover information concerning the defendant's editorial process. Id. at 155. Although the
defendant claimed first amendment privilege, the court rejected the claim and ordered defendant
to respond to plaintiff's interrogatories. Id. at 177. The court stated that under the broad authority
of rule 1 and the specific authority of rule 26, a district court has the power to control the discovery
process. Id.; see FED. R. Crv. P. 26 (general provisions governing discovery). Thus, while current
libel law might encourage more discovery, federal courts have the power to place limitations
on such discovery. See 441 U.S. at 177.
23. See Wioirr & MILLER, supra note 21, at 129-30 (discussion of duty of judge to use
proper discretion).
24. Id. at 130. To achieve justice-, a judge must not abuse his discretion. Id. Were the
judge to apply a federal rule without considering the context of the entire procedural system,
the judge would fail to meet the mandate of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, and thus
abuse his discretion. Id.
25. Id.
26. See text accompanying notes 19-22 (discussion of broad powers of federal judiciary).
27. See Fox, supra note 18, at 132 (settlement is tool of active judicial administration which
furthers goals of rule 1 of Federal Rules of Civil Procedure).
28. See WiuGoH & MMLER, supra note 21, § 1029, at 131 (goals of speed and inexpensive
cost are as important as goal of justice).
29. See supra notes 9-17 and accompanying text (discussion of Austin Power).
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had encouraged a procedure which violated the broad mandate of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure0
30
Premised on the goals of. justice, speed, and efficiency embodied in rule
1, rule 16 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure expands the role of the
trial judge in the prompt resolution of legal disputes." In the years immediately
following the adoption of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, most authorities
believed that parties should not discuss the topic of settlement in the presence
of the trial. judge.32 Nevertheless, the topic of settlement began to enter pretrial
conferences under the auspices of rule 16(c)( 11);31 which states that parties
to a pretrial conference may discuss any matters pertinent to resolution of
the dispute. 34 Recent amendments to rule 16"s have extended further the trial
judge's role in pretrial activities and have provided clear justification for judicial
30. See supra notes 19-22 and accompanying text (discussion of broad powers of the judiciary
under rule 1).
31. See Kozar v. Chesapeake & Ohio Ry., 320 F. Supp. 335, 373 (W.D. Mich. 1970) (pur-
pose of pretrial conference is to achieve mandate of rule 1), modified, 449 F.2d 1238 (6th Cir.
1971). Kozar v, Chesapeake & Ohio Ry. involved a claim for wrongful death. Id. at 338. At
trial, the judge refused to allow the defendant's mechanical engineering expert to testify because
the defendant had not listed the expert on the pretrial order. Id. at 373. On motion for retrial,
the United States District Court for the Western District of Michigan held that the purpose of
the pretrial conference was to aid in achieving the mandate of rule 1. Id. The Kozar court stated
that open discussion during the pretrial conference would help achieve a just and efficient resolu-
tion of the case. Id. The court concluded that exclusion of the expert's testimony was a proper
sanction under the circumstances of the case. Id. See also Orsterle, supra note 1, at 7 (rule 16
adds legitimacy to increased role of trial judge in encouraging settlement).
32. See Oesterle, supra note 1, at 7. The drafters of the original version of rule 16 believed
that settlement negotiations had no place in the pretrial conference. Id. The only purpose of
pretrial conferences was to narrow issues for trial. Id. The drafters believed that although settle-
ment might be the result of such preparation, settlement should constitute only a by-product,
and not a goal, of the pretrial conference. Id. In the 1940's and 1950's, most judges believed
that the only context in which a judge should mention settlement was in an inquiry by the judge
of whether the parties had discussed the possibility of settlement. Id. In the 1960's, a substantial
number of judges began to favor an increased role by the trial court in achieving settlement.
Id. This change in perspective culminated in the recent amendments to rule 16. See infra notes
35-36 (discussion of recent amendments to rule 16). See generally Fox, supra note 18, at 139
(discussion of impact of changing views of judicial involvement on amendment of rule 16). The
modern version of rule 16 encourages settlement as a tool of good judicial management. See
Fox at 139; FED. R. Civ. P. 16 (recent changes specifically mentioning settlement as topic for
pretrial conference).
33. See Oesterle, supra note 1, at 7 (rule 16(c)(11)) adds legitimacy to increased role of
trial judge in encouraging settlement); see also FED. R. Civ. P. 16(c)(11) (parties may discuss
at pretrial conference any matter that might aid in disposition of litigation).
34. See FED. R. Civ. P. 16(c)(11).
35. See id. In 1983, the advisory committee substantially altered rule 16 of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure. Id. One relevant amendment included the committee's change of the
title from "Pre-Trial Procedure; Formulating Issues," to "Pretrial Conferences; Scheduling;
Management" to reflect the changing scope of the rule. See FED. R. Crv. P. 16(a). In addition,
the committee added the phrase "facilitating the settlement of the case" as an objective of the
pretrial conference. See FED. R. Civ. P. 16(a)(5). The 1983 amendment recognized the changing
history of the role of the pretrial conference in judicial case management. See supra note 32
(discussion of rule 16 and changing role of trial judges). Finally, the committee added "possibility
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involvement in settlement negotiations. 6 Rule 16 now expressly mentions set-
tlement as an item which parties may discuss at the pretrial conference. 7 The
notion of judicial involvement in settlement negotiations, therefore, has become
an important part of the pretrial process.38
In addition to rules 1 and 16, rule 83 of the Federal Rules of Civil Pro-
cedure also provides a basis for judicial involvement in settlement negotiations.3
Rule 83 gives federal district courts the authority to create local rules that
are not inconsistent with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.4" Standing alone,
rule 83 does not answer the question of whether a judge's involvement in a
particular settlement is inconsistent with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.4
However, rule 83 does reflect the willingness of the drafters to give district
court judges wide latitude to implement the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
on a case-by-case basis.42 Appellate courts may review local court rules issued
under the authority of rule 83 only to the extent that the trial court abused
its discretion in promulgating the rule." Because of the desire of appellate
courts to refrain from overturning a district court's ruling, and thereby creating
of settlement" as a topic for discussion at the pretrial conference. See FED. R. Civ. P. 16(c)(7).
36. See Advisory Committee Note to the 1983 Amendments, 97 F.R.D. 165, 207 (1983)
[hereinafter cited as Advisory Committee Note]. The 1983 amendments to the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure shift the focus of the pretrial conference away from the trial itself and toward
the entire pretrial phase. See White Mountain Apache Tribe v. United States, 5 Ct. Cl 288, 291
(1984) (statement of Chief Justice Burger that 1983 amendments give judges important controls
at pretrial stage).
37. See FED. R. Civ. P. 16(c)(7); see also supra note 35 (discussion of amendments to rule
16(c)(7)).
38. See Advisory Committee Note, supra note 36, at 207.
39. See FED. R. Civ. P. 83 (district courts may regulate cases before it in any manner not
violative of Federal Rules of Civil Procedure).
40. Id.
41. See generally FED. R. Civ. P. 83 (freedom of trial court to establish local rules).
42. See MooRE, supra note 7, at 83.02 (under rule 83, trial judge has power to implement
his own rules so long as rules are not inconsistent with Federal Rules of Civil Procedure); see
also Miranda v. Southern Pac. Transp. Co., 710 F.2d 516, 521 (9th Cir. 1983) (trial court possesses
discretion in creating and applying local rules). In Miranda, the trial court fined both parties
for failing to comply with local rules concerning a pretrial conference. Id. at 519. Specifically,
the trial court stated that the plaintiff's memorandum of facts and contentions "rambled," and
that both parties had failed on several occasions to identify evidence and expert testimony. Id.
at 518. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that the trial
judge possessed the authority to impose sanctions on the attorneys. Id. at 522. The Ninth Circuit
stated that trial judges possess broad discretion in creating and applying local rules. Id. at 521;
see also Lance, Inc. v. Denco Serv., Inc., 422 F.2d 778, 784 (9th Cir. 1970) (court has broad
discretion in interpreting and applying local rules because purpose of local rules is to increase
efficiency of judicial arrangement).
43. See Greyhound Lines, Inc. v. Miller, 402 F.2d 134, 144-45 (8th Cir. 1968) (creation
of local rules regulating discovery is not abuse of discretion because court has authority to con-
trol time of discovery under rules 16 and 82); see also Wirtz v. Hooper-Holmes Bureau, Inc.,
327 F.2d 939, 943 (5th Cir. 1964) (Appelate courts should not overturn local rules except for
compelling reasons). In Wirtz v. Hooper-Holmes Bureau, Inc., the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Georgia dismissed the plaintiff's case for failure to provide a list
of witnesses. Id. at 940. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit
1985]
WASHINGTON AND LEE LAW REVIEW
conflict with the lower courts, the "abuse of discretion" standard permits
the trial judge to exercise unfettered creativity and ingenuity unless his order
violates the goals of other Federal Rules of Civil Procedure."
Notwithstanding the willingness of the drafters of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure to grant district courts broad powers under rule 83, the United
States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit in McCargo v. Hedrick" limited
the exercise of broad judicial involvement in pretrial proceedings. 4 In McCargo,
a local rule required parties to a litigation to submit a complex pretrial order.4 7
Upon the plaintiff's failure to meet the presiding magistrate's request for an
amendment to the pretrial order, the trial court dismissed the case under a
local rule for failure to prosecute."1 In reversing the trial court, the Fourth
Circuit held that the local rule violated the intent of rule 16 of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure, because the requirements of the local rule made
the procedure more complex and lengthy than the trial itself.' 9 Because the
local rule violated the intent of a Federal Rule of Civil Procedure, the Fourth
Circuit declared the local rule invalid under the authority implicit in rule 83 .0
The Fourth Circuit's decision in McCargo has removed some of the flexibility
of trial courts to fashion their own procedural rules." The McCargo court
thus has undermined the policy of allowing the district courts broad latitude
in implementing the goals of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.2
affirmed, holding that local rules were desirable and necessary for a federal district court to con-
trol the conduct of trials. Id. at 943. Appellate courts, therefore, should not declare local rules
invalid except for compelling reasons. Id. Since the appellants were unable to show that the trial
judge abused his discretion, the Fifth Circuit affirmed the trial judge's dismissal of the action.
Id.; see also National Hockey League v. Metro Hockey Club, 427 U.S. 639, 642-43 (1976) (defini-
tion of abuse of discretion in pretrial procedure). In National Hockey League v. Metro Hockey
Club, the appellants sought reversal of the dismissal of their suit for failure to answer inter-
rogatories timely. Id. In describing the "abuse of discretion" test, the Supreme Court stated
that an appellate court must not ask itself whether the appellate court would have dismissed
the action, but whether the trial court abused its discretion in so doing. Id.
44. See MooRE, supra note 7, at 83.02 (discussion of desire to minimize conflict between
circuit and district courts).
45. 545 F.2d 393, 402 (4th Cir. 1976).
46. Id.
47. Id. at 399. In McCargo v. Hedrick, the pretrial order required under local rule 2.08
was thirteen pages in length. Id. The rule also required the parties to submit complete pretrial
briefs with the pretrial order. Id.
48. Id. at 395 (local rule 2.09 allowed dismissal for failure to prosecute); cf. FED. R. Civ.
P. 41(b) (provision enables court to involuntarily dismiss plaintiff's case when plaintiff fails to
prosecute).
49. Id. at 401.
50. Id. at 402.
51. See McDermott, The Pretrial Order and McCargo v. Hedrick: Effective Management
or Unproductive Formalism?, 4 JusT. Sys. J. 245, 248 (1978) (discussion of effect of McCargo
on authority of court to control pretrial procedure).
52. Id. at 254. While McDermott states that the Fourth Circuit in McCargo has narrowed
a trial court's authority to control pretrial procedures, McDermott sharply criticizes the McCargo
opinion and questions its significance. Id. McDermott states that since the Fourth Circuit merely
substituted its judgment for that of the trial judge, the appellate court did not address fully the
real object of controversy; that is, the role of the pretrial order in litigation. Id.
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In addition to those judicial powers expressly provided in the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure, appellate courts traditionally have recognized that trial
judges possess certain inherent powers which derive from the very nature of
the judicial system. 3 To perform their judicial function, courts must possess
powers that provide judges with the latitude and authority to resolve disputes
in a just manner.5 4 Over the years, appellate courts have expanded the reach
of these inherent powers to include, among other things, the authority to dismiss
a case sua sponte for lack of prosecution,"5 to award attorney's fees to an
opposing party for bad faith litigation,5 6 and to impose monetary penalties
on counsel for violations of local rules." Although no court ever has used
the doctrine of inherent powers to justify the authority of a trial judge to
53. See United States v. Hudson and Goodwin, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 32, 34 (1812) (Supreme
Court's original recognition of inherent powers of judiciary). In United States v. Hudson and
Goodwin, the Supreme Court held that trial courts possess certain inherent powers, based on
the nature of the judicial institution. Id. These inherent powers'exist to enable the trial court
to perform its functions. Id. While inherent powers are not derived directly from statute, such
powers are essential nonetheless. Id. Among the court's inherent powers are the power to fine
for contempt, to imprison for contumacy, and to enforce the observance of order in the court.
Id. In recent years, the breadth of powers inherent to the judiciary has expanded greatly. See
infra notes 55-57 (description of modern examples of inherent powers).
54. See Note, Protective Orders Against the Press and the Inherent Powers of the Court,
87 YALE L.J. 342, 349-50 (1977) (discussion of internal checks on inherent powers) [hereinafter
cited as Inherent Powers]. Since the judiciary itself determines the breadth of inherent powers,
courts theoretically could grant themselves very broad authority in performing judicial functions.
Id. However, since the judiciary itself defines its inherent powers, the public is especially critical
of broad inherent powers. Id. at 351. Thus, the greatest check on the court's inherent powers
is the court system's fear that it will lose respect and legitimacy. Id. at 350.
55. See Link v. Wabash R.R., 370 U.S. 626, 628 (1962). In Link v. Wabash Railroad,
the plaintiff's attorney relayed a message that he would be unable to attend a pretrial conference
scheduled for later in the day. Id. at 628. Two hours after the time of the scheduled conference,
the trial judge, exercising what he termed his "inherent powers", dismissed the action for the
plaintiff's failure to appear at pretrial. Id. at 628-29. The Supreme Court affirmed, ruling that
authority to dismiss sua sponte derives from the inherent power of the judiciary. Id. at 630.
Such authority did not evolve from statute, but from the power of the court to manage its affairs
in a way that achieves prompt and orderly resolution of disputes. Id. at 630-31.
56. See Roadway Express, Inc. v. Piper, 447 U.S. 752, 766 (1980). In Roadway Express
Inc. v. Piper, the plaintiff brought a civil rights action alleging employment discrimination. Id.
at 754. After filing and answering one set of interrogatories, the plaintiff refused to cooperate
further in discovery. Id. Furthermore, the plaintiff refused to submit a brief, in direct violation
of a request by the trial court. Id. at 755. The trial court dismissed the case and awarded the
defendant attorney's fees. Id. at 756. The Fifth Circuit reversed, holding that an award of attorney's
fees was not proper under the circumstances of the case. Id. On appeal, the Supreme Court held
that courts possess the inherent power to assess attorney's fees when the plaintiff files suit in
bad faith or conducts the litigation in bad faith. Id. at 766.
57. See Miranda v. Southern Pacific Trans. Co., 710 F.2d 516, 522 (9th Cir. 1983). In
Miranda v. Southern Pacific Transportation Company, the United States District Court for the
Central District of California fined both opposing counsel in a civil case $250 for failing to obey
local rule 9. Id. at 518-19. Local rule 9 provided a procedure for submitting pretrial briefs. Id.
at 518. The district court requested that counsel amend their briefs to reflect a concise statement
of the facts and to reflect information concerning expert witnesses. Id. When both attorneys
failed to satisfy a second request by the district court, the court imposed monetary sanctions.
Id. at 519. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit remanded the
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encourage settlement, the inherent powers doctrine provides justification for
judicial intervention in the settlement process. 8 Consistent with the expand-
ing role of the trial judge as case manager, the judge must inherently possess
effective tools to fulfill that role.
5 9
Although a trial court possesses the inherent power to control the disposi-
tion of cases, the court's inherent power is not without limitations. 60 Courts
should not use their inherent powers in the absence of reasonable necessity."I
In other words, a court may not utilize its inherent powers simply on the basis
of convenience.' 2 An additional requirement is that courts may not use their
inherent powers to serve any function other than controlling cases that litigants
bring before the court. 63 Finally, a court may not exercise power that would
disrupt the balance between other branches of government.'. The court may
not use its inherent powers to usurp power from the legislative and executive
branches.
65
With the possible exception of the reasonable necessity requirement, none
of the above limitations appear applicable to the question of judicial authority
to encourage settlement. 6 However, two major limitations which are relevant
to the issue of judicial involvement in settlement negotiations are the rule 83
requirement that a local rule may not contradict the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure,'61 and the limitation imposed by the due process clause of the fourth
case for a proper hearing on the sanctions, but stated that a district court possesses the inherent
authority to impose sanctions against attorneys for failure to obey local rules. Id. at 520.
In addition to the inherent powers mentioned above, one commentator has argued that
a trial court also possesses the inherent authority to issue protective orders against the press dur-
ing trial. See Inherent Powers, supra note 54, at 348. The goal of the court to provide fair trials
gives the court inherent authority to issue protective orders against the press. Id.; see also Sun
Co. v. Superior Court, 29 Cal. App. 3d 815, 824-25, 105 Cal. Rptr. 873, 880 (1973) (court's
power to issue protective orders arises from inherent power of the court). Although the Sun court
held a pretrial order against the press violative of first amendment protections, the court held
that the authority to issue protective orders in general arises from the inherent powers of the
court. Id.
58. Sees supra notes 53-57 and accompanying text (discussion of trial court's inherent powers).
59. See Fox, supra note 18, at 136 (discussion of tools needed to lead litigation to just
and speedy settlement).
60. See infra text accompanying notes 61-66 (discussion of limitations on inherent powers).
61. See Inherent Powers, supra note 54, at 351-52 (while concept of reasonable necessity
varies, reasonable necessity implies that rationale for court's action must be more than mere
convenience or desirability).
62. Id. at 352.
63. Id. at 356-57.
64. Id. at 362.
65. Id.
66. See supra text accompanying notes 61-65. The restriction that a court may use inherent
powers only to resolve cases and controversies is not applicable to the question of the inherent
power to encourage settlement. See Inherent Powers, supra note 54, at 356. All matters in which
the judge might encourage settlement are cases already in the court's files. Id. Similarly, the
limitation of separation of powers is inapplicable as neither the legislative nor the executive branch
has an interest in the control of settlement negotiations by the court. Id. at 362.
67. See FED. R. Crw. P. 83 (rule 83 states in part that district courts may control litigation
in any manner that is not inconsistent with Federal Rules of Civil Procedure).
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amendment to the United States Constitution. 8 Under rule 83 trial judges
may issue only those orders that are not inconsistent with the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure.69 While rule 83 provides justification for an increased
judicial role in settlement negotiations, the requirement of consistency with
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure limits the power of judges to direct the
settlement process.7" Rule 83 applies not only to rules that local courts expressly
adopt, but also to those rules based on the inherent powers of the court.7'
A greater constraint on the judicial power of the trial court is the con-
stitutional requirement of due process.
72 In a case similar to Austin Power,
73
the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit held in In re LaMarre 
4
that due process prohibited the trial judge from compelling a settlement of
which one or both of the parties did not approve. 75 Although the Sixth Cir-
cuit held in LaMarre that a trial judge could require a party's attendance at
a pretrial settlement conference, the court stated that the trial judge could
not require an unwilling party to accept a settlement offer. 76 Similarly, the
United States District Court for the District of Connecticut held in J.M. Clemin-
shaw Co. v. City of Norwich that the constraints of due process limited a
trial judge's authority to impose a sanction for failure to follow pretrial
discovery procedures. 77 The Cleminshaw court stated that the reasonableness
68. U.S. CONST. amend. V. ("No person shall.., be deprived of life, liberty, or property,
without due process of law . . . "); see infra notes 72-82 and accompanying text (discussion
of due process as limitation on court's inherent powers to conduct settlement negotiations).
69. See supra notes 39 & 67 and accompanying text (discussion of requirements of rule 83).
70. See supra notes 39-52 and accompanying text (discussion of rule 83 as justification
for judicial participation in settlement negotiations).
71. Id.
72. See supra note 68 (discussion of due process clause of fifth amendment).
73. See supra notes 9-17 and accompanying text (discussion of Austin Power).
74. 494 F.2d 753, 756 (6th Cir. 1974).
75. Id. In In re LaMarre, the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan
ordered LaMarre, a claims adjuster for the defendant's insurance company, to attend a con-
ference and explain why he was unwilling to accept a settlement offer. Id. at 755. On several
occasions, LaMarre refused to attend such a conference. Id. After a full hearing, the district
court held LaMarre in contempt. Id. at 754. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals
for the Sixth Circuit held that because the form of the request did not amount to an order,
the trial court could not hold LaMarre in contempt. Id. at 759. Nonetheless, the Sixth Circuit
stated that an order requiring the attendance of a party at pretrial is a proper exercise of judicial
power. Id. at 756. However, the court stated that a judge could not force a settlement on one
or both parties who found the offer unacceptable. Id.
76. Id.
77. See J.M. Cleminshaw Co. v. City of Norwich, 93 F.R.D. 338, 351-52 n.1l (D. Conn.
1981). J.M. Cleminshaw Co. v. City of Norwich involved a civil action in which a defendant
failed to answer a set of interrogatories or produce documents that the plaintiff requested. Id.
at 344. After one year, the plaintiff moved for and received an order compelling discovery. Id.
at 345. When the defendant ignored the deadline of the court's order, the plaintiff moved for
sanctions under rule 37(d) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Id. at 345; see FED. R. Cv.
P. 37(d) (sanctions for failure to complete discovery). While the district court ultimately imposed
sanctions on the defendant's attorney, the court held that any imposition of sanctions, including
a fine, was subject to the requirements of due process. 93 F.R.D. at 351 n.11. The court must
determine such due process requirements on a case-by-case basis. Id.
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of constraints is ascertainable only on a case-by-case basis." Thus, when defen-
dant's counsel repeatedly disregarded discovery deadlines, the trial judge's
imposition of discovery sanctions was proper so long as the sanctions met
the requirements of due process.
7 9
Due process also may limit a trail judge's involvement in settlement,
because a judge who coerces parties into a settlement injects into trial a con-
sideration outside the merits of the case." Therefore, in making the decision
to settle, a party must evaluate its case not only in terms of those facts arising
from discovery and pretrial investigation, but also in terms of the judge's poten-
tial reaction to a decision not to settle the case." By forcing a settlement,
the judge may press one party into a situation which is not in that party's
best interest, thereby violating that party's due process rights.2
One final legal factor that affects the behavior of judges in determining
their role in settling civil actions is the statutory provision governing a trial
judge's disqualification for partiality.8 3 Based in part on the American Bar
Association Code of Judicial Conduct,84 section 455 of the United States Code
places some restrictions on the participation of the federal judiciary in pretrial
procedure. 85 Among the relevant sections, section 455(a) states that any federal
judge must disqualify himself whenever a party reasonably might question
the judge's impartiality." In addition, under section 455(b), a judge should
disqualify himself when he has a personal bias or when he has personal
knowledge of disputed evidentiary facts in the litigation."' Since trial judges
78. 93 F.R.D. at 351 n.11.
79. Id.
80. See Resnik, Managerial Judges, 96 HAv. L. Rav. 374, 425 (1982). Professor Resnik
presents a hypothetical case in which a trial court judge issued pretrial directions before the par-
ties had requested his assistance. Id. As such, the judge was not adjudicating an actual "case
or controversy." Id.
81. See id. (parties may subject themselves to judicial hostility if parties anger or irritate judge).
82. See id. (discussion of judicial hostility); State ex rel Allen v. Board of Pub. Instruction,
214 So. 2d 7, 10 (Fla. Dist Ct. App. 1968) (parties have due process right to fair and impartial trial).
83. See 28 U.S.C. § 455 (1982) (regulation of disqualification of judges in civil and criminal
actions).
84. See A.B.A. CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT (1982). Among relevant sections of the A.B.A.
Code, canon 1 states that "a judge should uphold the integrity and independence of the judiciary."
Id. canon 1. Canon 2 states that judges should avoid impropriety or the appearance of impropriety
at all times. Id. canon 2. Finally, canon 3 states that judges should perform the duties of their
offices with diligence and impartiality. Id. canon 3.
While Congress has amended the United States Code to comply with these sections of the
Code of Judicial Conduct, the Code of Judicial Conduct is not binding on the court. See Virginia
Elec. & Power Co. v. Sun Shipbldg. and Dry Dock Co., 407 F. Supp. 324, 326 (E.D. Va. 1976)
(Code of Judicial Conduct does not bind courts), vacated 539 F.2d 357, 369 (4th Cir. 1976) (agreeing
with trial court that Code of Judicial Conduct may aid judge). However, a court should take
notice of the Code of Judicial Conduct in interpreting the intent of Congress. Id. at 327.
85. See infra text accompanying notes 86-88 (discussion of judicial restrictions under 28
U.S.C. § 455).
86. 28 U.S.C. § 455(a) (1982) (judge must disqualify himself when party reasonably ques-
tions his impartiality).
87. 28 U.S.C. § 455(b) (1982) (judge must disqualify himself if he has bias or personal
knowledge of evidentiary facts).
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frequently pressure both parties without giving any appearance of partiality,
section 455 often would not apply. However, if the judge does not apply even
pressure to settle to both parties, or if he makes a pretrial ruling which pressures
only one party to settle, the judge may create an appearance of bias. 8 Under
these circumstances, a party might have grounds for appeal if the judge fails
to remove himself from the trial proceeding.8 9
The controversy surrounding the legal and philosophical justifications and
limitations for judicial involvement in the settlement process manifests itself
in the debate between those advocating a managerial or active judge, and those
advocating the traditional judicial role. 9 In her article, Managerial Judges,9
Professor Judith Resnik discusses the erosion of due process at the hands of
the "managerial judge."' 92 Managerial judges are those judges who take an
active role in the shaping of litigation prior to trial. 9 Such judges have assumed
an increased responsibility in advancing cases to completion.9" Because the
managerial judge possesses far greater power than the traditional judge, 9 the
managerial judge has far greater potential to abuse that power.9 6 Moreover,
since the managerial judge has substantial dealings with the parties before trial,
he may develop personal feelings that interfere with his impartiality toward
the litigants. 97 In addition, because the managerial judge often has exposure
to information that may not constitute admissible evidence, the judge may
have a tainted view of the facts before the trial begins.'
In opposition to this argument, one federal judge has stated that such
"built in bias" does not exist in actual practice.9 In this experience with pretrial
88. See supra text accompanying note 86 (discussion of rule against judicial partiality).
89. See supra text accompanying notes 86-88 (discussion of limitations on judiciary under
28 U.S.C. § 455).
90. Compare Resnik, supra note 80, at 376-448 (discussion of rationale underlying limited
judicial role in case management) with Fox, supra note 18, at 129-58 (discussion of rationale
underlying broad judicial involvement in case management). See also infra notes 90-119 and
accompanying text (discussion of debate between Resnik and Fox concerning judicial activism).
91. See generally Resnik, supra note 80 at 376-448 (discussion of rationale underlying limited
judicial involvement in case management).
92. Id.
93. Id. at 376-77 (definition of "managerial judge").
94. Id. at 378 (judges now assume responsibility for seeing cases to completion).
95. Id. (managerial functions of trial judge result in greater judicial power).
96. Id. at 425 (case manager has far greater potential to abuse power than adjudicator).
According to Professor Resnik, one of the side effects of judicial management is that judicial
managers have different goals and techniques than traditional judges. Id. at 424-25. Managerial
judges tend to prefer the goal of speed of resolution over the goals of impartiality and fairness.
Id. at 425. Therefore, managerial judges are more likely to abuse their power than traditional
judges. Id.
97. Id. at 427 (by increased interaction with attorneys prior to trial, active judge increases
opportunity for partiality and bias).
98. Id.
99. See Fox, supra note 18, at 144-45 (discussion of ability of trial judge to avoid partiality).
Judge Fox believes that the threat of impartiality of managerial judges is more theoretical than
real. Id. at 144. Fox suggests that while a built-in bias may exist in theory, in reality no such
threat exists. Id.
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procedure and settlement conferences, Judge Fox of the Federal District Court
for the Western District of Michigan has found that perceptions of judicial
bias have disappeared and that the local bar has endorsed the judge's require-
ment of a compulsory pretrial docket.' 0 According to Judge Fox, the experience
and integrity required of a United States district court judge enables the judge
to divorce the pretrial stage from the actual trial proceeding, and thus avoid
the threat of a distortion of justice that Resnik sees.' 0'
In support of Judge Fox's argument for a judge's active role in pretrial
negotiations, other commentators cite several policy reasons for a judge's par-
ticipation in the settlement process.' 0 2 First, since settlement avoids a trial pro-
ceeding, the parties save money by reducing court costs and eliminating the
possibility of a costly appeal. 0 3 Second, settlements are flexible in their
formulation. " A party is not faced with the "win or lose" proposition that
he faces at trial.10 Both parties may compromise, feeling that the proposed
settlement is to their benefit, without risking a total loss at the hands of a
jury. 0 6 Parties also gain from settlement a sense of certainty and finality in
knowing that the opposing party may not appeal the case." 7
From a judicial perspective, participation in settlement negotiations
increases the efficiency of court administration.'10 As more cases settle sooner,
courts save both time and money. 0 9 Moreover, while parties are reluctant to
propose settlement and appear weak, judicial control of negotiations and pro-
100. Id. at 144-45. In 1951, Judge Fox began a mandatory pretrial procedure in his district,
the Western District of Michigan. Id. at 144. While the procedure initially met oppostion, that
opposition has disappeared. Id. The local bar has appreciated the efforts of managerial judges
and has recommended the adoption of Fox's compulsory pretrial procedure for all cases. Id.
at 144-45.
101. Id. at 145. Judge Fox states that federal judges do not achieve their judicial position
without experience. Id. Such experience allows a managerial judge to separate pretrial from the
trial itself. Id. This process is no different from the judge's refusal, as trier of fact, to consider
evidence that he has excluded. Id.
102. See generally Oesterle, supra note 1, at 7 (discussion of avoidance of trial as reducing
costs of dispute resolution); Schiller and Wall, Judicial Settlement Techniques, 5 AM. J. TRIAL
ADvoc. 39, 40 (1981) (discussion of policy reasons for judicial participation in settlement
negotiations).
103. See Schiller and Wall, supra note 102, at 40 (discussion of settlement as reducing costs
of litigation).
104. See Oesterle, supra note 1, at 8 (while court judgment often may be extreme in creating




107. See Schiller and Wall, supra note 102, at 40 (certainty results from successful settle-
ment negotiations because parties may not appeal settled case).
108. See Oesterle, supra note 1, at 8. Judicial activism in settlement negotiations increases
the efficiency of the court. Id. Many cases are settled that parties might never settle otherwise.




posals for settlement may encourage what both parties desired all along.'
In addition, judicial participation in the settlement process may keep negotia-
tions in perspective by preventing frivolous haggling or improper offers."'
Finally, with the trial judge aiding the parties in the settlement of their case,
the public has a better perception of the judicial process," 2 because justice
comes swiftly, and settlements reduce the backlog of cases." 3
Advocates of limited judicial participation in settlement negotiations cite
studies which establish that judicial activity does not increase the likelihood
of settlement.' " In arguing against the idea that judicial involvement increases
settlement, one authority has stated that the greatest aid in encouraging settle-
ment is not activism by the court, but merely the court's willingness to set
a trial date and to bring the case to trial.'" Critics also argue that settlement
negotiations often become "mini-trials" in which litigants present evidence,
attorneys make opening and closing statements, and the judge issues his
"decision.""1 6 The danger of this procedure lies in the possibility that the
judge's decision at the "mini-trial" may carry over into the actual trial if
negotiations fail to produce a settlement. " Preconceived notions may prejudice
110. Id. Lawyers frequently are reluctant to propose settlement first, for fear of creating
perceptions of weaknesses. Id. However, a judge may initiate settlement proposals without creating
signs of weakness in either party. Id.
111. See id. (since judge lends air of dignity to negotiations, parties are more likely to take
formal, dignified approach to negotiations).
112. See Schiller and Wall, supra note 102, at 41 (discussion of advantages of active judicial
role in settlement negotiations). The early settlement of cases reduces both the time spent on
a case and the backlog of pending cases. Id. Therefore, the public perceives a more efficient
administration of justice. Id.
113. Id.
114. See generally Flanders, Case Management in Federal Courts: Some Controversies and
Some Results, 4 Just. Sys. J. 147 (1978). In a study by Flanders of six representative federal
district courts, the court with the largest role in the settlement process had the fewest settlements
per year. Id. at 161. In contrast, the court with the least judicial involvement in negotiations
had the second largest number of settlements. Id.; see also Church, Civil Case Delay in State
Trial Courts, 4 JusT. Sys. J. 166, 188-89 (1978). Church states that judges often find that in
a large number of cases in which they participate in pretrial, litigants actually settle. Church,
at 188-89. However, parties would have settled many of these cases anyway. Id. Thus, Church
states that substantial judicial involvement in settlement negotiations is largely unproductive. Id.
at 189.
115. See Church, supra note 114, at 189. According to Church's study, attorneys in every
district surveyed stated that the threat of upcoming trial was one factor which encouraged settle-
ment. Id. Extensive judicial activity thus may not settle cases as often as the reality of an approaching
trial date. Id.
116. See Oesterle, supra note 1, at 10. Settlement negotiations in which the judge has a
large role may take the appearance of a trial itself. Id. Such "mini-trials" can constitute a dangerous
practice, because parties are unable to fully present their "case" in such a short time. Id. Therefore,
a judge may become misinformed as to the full facts of the case. Id.
117. See id. (although judge may have no subjective intent to carry preconceived notions
of merits to trial, human nature dictates that judge may enter trial without impartial mind). But
see Fox, supra note 18, at 145 (discussion of judge's ability to avoid bias).
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the judge in his control of the litigation. "' Thus, those favoring a limited
role for trial judges argue that if the trial judge must have a role in settlement
negotiations, standards should exist which control the court's conduct during
the negotiations." 9
Several federal cases have addressed the debate between those advocating
managerial judges and those advocating more traditional judges, particularly
in the area of judicial participation in settlement negotiations.' 20 In In re
LeMarre, the Sixth Circuit held that a trial court could compel the claims
manager of one party to attend a pretrial hearing in which settlement was
the principal topic of discussion.'I' While the LaMarre decision gave trial judges
wider latitude in managing cases toward resolution, the decision also limited
that latitude by declaring that the trial judge could not compel settlement.' 2
However, the LaMarre court apparently believed that requiring the attendance
118. See supra text accompanying notes 97-98 (discussion of possibility of prejudicial behavior
on part of trial judge after settlement conference).
119: See Oesterle, supra note I, at 11 (if legal community decides that judicial participation
in settlement is productive, legal community at least should create guidelines for regulating judicial
participation); see also Resnik, supra note 80, at 432-35 (discussion of methods for preserving
litigants' rights to fair trial while allowing judge control of case management).
120. See infra notes 121-45 and accompanying text (discussion of federal cases addressing
role of judge in pretrial activities). Judicial involvement in the settlement process is an active
issue in state courts as well as federal courts. For example, in Cropp v. Woleslagel, the Kansas
Supreme Court held that a trial judge had the power to require the defendant to disclose the
policy limits of his liability insurance. 207 Kan. 627, - , 485 P.2d 1271, 1276 (1971). The court
held that because the encouragement of settlement was a goal of pretrial activities, the trial court
properly could require disclosure of policy limits. 485 P.2d at 1276. The court reasoned that
knowledge of the limits of the defendant's insurance policy would be necessary for settlement
discussion. Id. However, the court stressed that a trial judge should never attempt to force settle-
ment, but merely help to facilitate a settlement. Id.
Similarly, in a dissenting opinion in Conachan v. Williams, an Oregon State Supreme Court
justice stated that if a plaintiff claims lost wages and medical expenses, the plaintiff must state
these claims before trial begins. 266 Or. 45, -, 511 P.2d 392, 404 (1973). The judge in Conachan
reasoned that such early pleading would make settlement easier to negotiate, thereby fulfilling
the desire of the court to encourage the settlement of cases. 511 P.2d at 404.
Finally, in In re Marriage of Hitchcock, the Supreme Court of Iowa held that a trial judge
may not announce his views regarding a fair divorce settlement figure. 265 N.W.2d 599, 606
(Iowa 1978). The court stated that by announcing his view, the trial judge placed the parties
in the position of either settling at the judge's price or trying the case before a judge who apparently
had already decided on distribution of the parties' assets. Id. Therefore, the appellate court voided
the earlier settlement and remanded the case for retrial. Id.
121. In re LaMarre, 494 F.2d 753, 756 (6th Cir. 1974); see supra note 75 (discussion of
In re LaMarre); see also Curto v. Int'l Longshoreman's and Warehouseman's Union, 107 F. Supp.
805, 808 (D. Ore. 1952). Curto v. International Longshoreman's and Warehouseman's Union
involved a labor dispute. 107 F. Supp. at 806. The United States District Court for the District
of Oregon required the presence of all individual defendants and labor leaders at a pretrial con-
ference. Id. at 808. The court justified this mandatory attendance by stating that such action
expedited the case and reduced delays, as well as enabled the parties to correct factual errors
and aid in the advancement of the case. Id.
122. See supra note 75 (LaMarre court held that trial court can require party's attendance
at pretrial, but cannot compel settlement).
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of a party at a pretrial conference did not operate to compel settlement.'23
While the LaMarre court addressed the issue of required attendance at
trial, the recent "Agent Orange" Product Liability Litigation addressed the
question of judicial activism in encouraging settlement in several other
contexts.' 2 In one such case, the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of New York had issued a ruling that restored the federal government
as a party to the litigation. '2S The trial court judge stated that returning the
government as a party to the litigation would facilitate settlement. 26 On
interlocutory appeal, the Second Circuit upheld the district court's decision
on other grounds. 27 However, the Second Circuit stated in dictum that the
addition of a party to litigation merely to facilitate settlement was an abuse
of discretion. 28 The Second Circuit, therefore, limited a tool of judicial
management without providing a clear test of how such involvement amounts
to an abuse of discretion.
29
In an earlier "Agent Orange" action certifying a class of veterans and
their families, the Untied States District Court for the Eastern District of New
York stated that one reason for certification of the class was the increased
possibility of settlement resulting from a single suit. 3 The district court stated
123. See generally In re LaMarre, 494 F.2d at 753-59 (trial court may not compel settlement).
124. See "Agent Orange" Product Liability Litigation, No. 84-3021 (2d Cir. April 13, 1984)
(available Sept. 5, 1984 on LEXIS, Genfed library, Cases file); "Agent Orange" Product Liability
Litigation, 100 F.R.D. 718, 733 (E.D.N.Y. 1983).
125. See In re "Agent Orange" Product Liability Litigation, No. 84-3021 (2d Cir. April
13, 1984) (available Sept. 5, 1984 on LEXIS, Genfed library, Cases file). The "Agent Orange"
litigation involved a claim by Vietnam War veterans and their families against the manufacturers
of a certain defoliant known as "agent orange." Id. The veterans and their families also brought
suit against the federal government, which purchased and used the chemical. Id. Early in the
litigation, the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York removed the
federal government from the litigation under the Feres-Stencel doctrine, which provided that ser-
vicemen could not file military claims against the government for injuries sustained in the line
of duty. Id.; see Stencel Aero Eng'g Corp. v. United States, 431 U.S. 666, 674 (1977) (federal
government has not waived sovereign immunity to servicemen); Feres v. United States, 340 U.S.
135, 146 (1950) (federal government has not waived sovereign immunity to servicemen). On appeal
the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit upheld the decision of the district
court to restore the government as a party to the litigation. In re "Agent Orange" No. 84-3021,
slip op. The Second Circuit reasoned that the Feres-Stencel doctrine did not apply to the third-
party claims of servicemen's families. Id. The Second Circuit, however, criticized the district
court for its statement that the restoration of the government to the action would facilitate settle-
ment. Id. The appellate court stated that if facilitation of settlement was the only reason for
restoring the government to the lawsuit, the order would amount to an abuse of discretion. Id.
126. Id.; see supra note 125 (discussion of facts of "Agent Orange" litigation).
127. Id. In the "Agent Orange" litigation, the Second Circuit upheld the lower court's order
reinstating the federal government as party to the action, because the Second Circuit found that
the order represented a rational interpretation of an area of law not yet ruled on by the Supreme
Court. Id. Specifically, the Second Circuit reasoned that until the Supreme Court extended the
breadth of the Feres-Stencel doctrine, such an order by the district court was proper. Id.
128. Id.
129. See id (Second Circuit did not provide test for abuse of discretion).
130. See In re "Agent Orange" Product Liability Litigation, 100 F.R.D. 718, 721 (E.D.N.Y.
1983). In the "Agent Orange" litigation, the United States District Court for the Eastern District
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that defendants could negotiate more easily with a single class of plaintiffs
than with individual plaintiffs. 3 ' Moreover, the court noted that the case
required strong case management because of its complexity.'32 The district
court concluded that judicial maintenance of a class action suit would therefore
constitute the best method of resolution. '
An issue related to the question of judicial involvement in settlement is
the issue of judicial power to compel attendance at trial.3 4 In Steel, Inc. v.
Atchison, Topeka, and Santa Fe Railway,' 3- the United States District Court
for the District of Kansas held that one party could not compel the attendance
of the other party at trial unless the court could subpoena the party's attendance
under rule 45 of the Federal rules of Civil Procedure.' 36 Although the Steel
case involved a question of the court's subpoena power rather than judicial
compulsion, Steel does illustrate the district court's recognition that a judge's
interference with the presentation of a party's case constitutes improper case
management. 37 Similarly, in Dinsel v. Pennsylvania Railroad,31 the United
States District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania held that a trial
court had no authority to compel a party's attendance during any part of
the trial. 39 While an opposing party may subpoena the plaintiff as an adverse
witness, the Dinsel court stated that the trial judge may not compel the plain-
tiff's attendance absent a proper subpoena.' 4 1
of New York cited an increased possibility of settlement as one reason for its decision to certify
a class. Id. at 723. The court stated that consolidation of all claims into a single action would
facilitate settlement discussions and ultimately increase the chances of settlement. Id.
131. Id.
132. See id. at 723-24 (certification of class was only means of effecting judicial manage-
ment of complex "Agent Orange" litigation).
133. Id.
134. See Austin Power, No. 83-2702 at 2 (court may not compel attendance of board of
directors at trial); see also Appellant's Brief, supra note 10, at 25-26. The Appellants in Austin
Power argued that forced attendance at trial operated to compel a settlement. Appellant's Brief
at 26. When the court forces a party to attend trial, the court places substantial pressure on
the party to settle. See id.
135. 41 F.R.D. 337, 339 (D. Kan. 1967).
136. Id. at 339; see FED. R. Civ. P. 45 (procedure for subpoena of witnesses). Steel Inc.
v. Atchison, Topeka and Santa Fe Railway involved an action for repayment of excessive freight
charges. 41 F.R.D. at 338. The defendants moved the United States District Court for the District
of Kansas to require each of the plaintiffs to attend trial in order to give testimony. Id. at 338.
Rule 45 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure delineated the process by which parties may
subpoena witnesses. See FED. R. Cxv. P. 45(a) (clerk of court shall issue subpoena stating name
of court and title of action and commanding party to appear at trial).
137. Steel, 41 F.R.D. at 339. The Steel court stated that a party has the choice of whether
or not the party will attend trial. Id. While the party may fail to meet its burden of proof by
not attending trial, the party still retains the option of attending trial or remaining absent. Id.
138. 144 F. Supp. 883, 884 (W.D. Pa. 1956).
139. Id. In Dinsel v. Pennsylvania Railroad, the plaintiff sustained injuries while under the
employ of Pennsylvania Railroad. Id. At trial, the defendant requested that the court call the
plaintiff as a witness. Id. Since the defendant failed to subpoena the plaintiff properly, the court
could not compel the plaintiff to attend trial absent some other court order. Id. Because the
court could not find any authority for such a compulsory order, the trial judge upheld the right




In contrast to Steel and Dinsel, the United States Court of Appeals for
the Third Circuit held in Torino v. Texaco that the district court's dismissal
of the suit was proper in light of the plaintiff's failure to attend trial and
other incidents illustrating the plaintiff's lack of interest.' 4 ' The Court held
that although a party may present its case as it chooses, that party never-
theless must act in a reasonable manner."' Under the circumstances of the
case, the Torino court found that the plaintiff's failure to appear was not
reasonable. "I
While the Torino decision appears to be inconsistent with the decisions
in Steel and Dinsel, courts generally recognize that a party's right to control
the presentation of its case includes the right to choose whether or not the
party will personally attend trial.'" However, this right is not absolute. As
the cases above illustrate, at times courts have held that the need for judicial
control is superior to the party's right to control the presentation of its case.' 5
Thus, while the Eighth Circuit in Austin Power ruled that requiring the
attendance of both of the boards of directors was improper, the court reasoned
that because of the complexity of the case, the compelled attendance of one
director and one officer was proper.' 6
The formulation of standards controlling judicial conduct during settle-
ment proceedings represents a compromise between those advocating an active
managerial judiciary and those advocating a more traditional judicial role in
settlement negotiations. The increase in judicial authority in recent years has
placed the trial judge in a position of unprecedented power.' 7 Today, the
trend is toward increasing judicial involvement in all stages of pretrial
activities,' 8 and settlerhent resulting from this judicial involvement is one of
the most practical by-products of the trial judge's expanding role.' 9 However,
141. See Torino v. Texaco, Inc., 378 F.2d 268, 270 (3d Cir. 1967). Torino v. Texaco, Inc.
involved a civil action in which the plaintiff failed to attend trial. Id. at 269. In an earlier ruling,
the court refused to dismiss the action provided that the plaintiff would sign a statement that
he wished to try the case and would be present for trial. Id. When the plaintiff failed to appear
at trial, the court dismissed the action sua sponte although the plaintiff's counsel was prepared
to proceed with the case. Id. Citing Link v. Wabash Railroad, the Third Circuit on appeal stated
that dismissal under the circumstances was within the inherent power of the court. Id. at 270;
see Link v. Wabash Ry., 370 U.S. 626, 630-31 (1962) (court has inherent authority to dismiss
case for failure to prosecute); supra note 55 (discussion of Link). Although a plaintiff may pre-
sent his case as he wishes, the Torino court held that reasonable behavior on the part of the
plaintiff served as a limitation to such freedom. 378 F.2d at 270.
142. See 378 F.2d at 270.
143. Id.
144. See supra notes 134-46 and accompanying text (discussion of required attendance of
parties at trial).
145. Id.
146. See Nebraska Public Power District v. Austin Power, Inc., No. 83-2702, slip op. at
2 (8th Cir. Jan. 11, 1984) (per curiam).
147. See supra note 95 and accompanying text (judge who takes active role in case manage-
ment acquires greater judicial power).
148. See Fox, supra note 18, at 132 (judge is responsible for insuring that cases move forward).
149. Id. at 139.
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unless established guidelines delineate the role of the trial judge in settlement
negotiations, the judge has the propensity to abuse his expanding authority.
Despite his best efforts to the contrary, a judge's human nature prohibits him
from remaining totally neutral and objective under the pressure of settlement
negotiations.'" The judge's human shortcomings are of most concern in cases
involving unrestricted judicial involvement in settlement proceedings. Addi-
tionally, the American judicial system is primarily an adversary system in which
each party is responsible for presenting its case as the party sees fit.' 5' To
allow the judge to coerce parties to settle their case would destroy the adver-
sary nature of the judicial system."' Only with clear guidelines may the judge
properly control certain facets of pretrial activities while protecting the adver-
sary nature of the system.'-
3
Professor Resnik proposes several suggestions for controlling judicial con-
duct in settlement negotiations.' 5 ' Resnik advocates the formulation of a manual
which would provide guidelines for judicial management.'"5 Another possible
remedy would be Congressional action under title 28 to create appellate review
of judicial management decisions."" Finally, Professor Resnik advocates a
system which would not permit a judge who mediates a settlement negotiation
to try the case, if the attempt at settlement fails. t5"
Guidelines for effective judicial management should include mechanisms
to aid the trial court judge in controlling settlement negotiations. First, a judge
should possess the authority to inquire at any time as to the possibility of
settlement or as to the potential benefits of further settlement discussion. Such
150. See supra note 97 and accompanying text (pretrial activity increases likelihood of judicial
bias at trial).
151. See McCargo v. Hedrick, 545 F.2d 393, 401 (1976) (principle of adversary relationships
in which each party is responsible for preparing its case for trial is basis for trial system).
152. Id.
153. See supra note 119 and accompanying text (discussion of need for guidelines to control
judicial involvement in pretrial procedure).
154. See Resnik, supra note 80, at 432-35 (discussion of safeguards for judicial management).
155. Id. at 433. Professor Resnik advocates the establishment of a manual for judicial manage-
ment similar to the Manual for Complex Litigation. See MANuAL FOR COMPLEX LniIoATioN (5th
ed. 1982) (recommendations of Federal Judicial Center for judicial control of complex cases).
Such a manual would provide detailed rules for participation in settlement negotiations. See Resnik,
supra note 80, at 433.
156. See Resnik, supra note 80, at 433. According to Professor Resnik, constant appellate
review of settlement procedure would allow the court system to refine continually the process
of judicial management. Id. In this manner, appellate courts may synthesize current judicial
philosophy with practical experience. Id. See also supra notes 83-89 and accompanying text
(discussion of Congressional legislation concerning judicial activism).
157. Id. at 433-34. Professor Resnik suggests that judges who mediate settlement negotia-
tions should not preside at a later trial. Id. at 433. Use of a master calendar system could achieve
this goal. Id. at 434. Under such a system, different judges would preside at each stage of litiga-
tion. Id. Another solution would be to create one set of judges who would mediate and another
set who would adjudicate. Id. at 436. Additionally, judges might achieve this result by swapping
cases at each level of trial preparation. Id.
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a guideline also should allow the judge to require that parties meet and discuss
the possibility of settlement. Second, a judge should possess the power to sug-
gest to the parties that he serve as mediator in the settlement negotiations.
Third, the judge also should have the authority to suggest alternatives to litiga-
tion or to suggest innovative rulings that would assist both parties in reaching
a beneficial settlement. However, a judge never should act in a manner that
would suggest the possibility of future animosity toward a party if the party
fails to reach a settlement. Finally, a judge never should discuss the case unless
both parties are present."" Only by the elimination of ex parte communica-
tions can the court maintain the appearance of absolute impartiality.
Given the multiplicity of factors which affect the trial judge's role in the
pretrial process, exact definition of the trial judge's role is difficult. However,
a committee sponsored by the American Bar Association might make progress
in creating clearer guidelines for successful judicial management. Although
the breadth of judicial power tends to evade the confines of narrow specificity,
an impartial committee under the auspices of the American Bar Association
might well succeed in clarifying an ambiguous and rapidly developing area
of the law.' 59
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158. Id. at 433. Professor Resnik favors the abolition of all ex parte communications. Id.
Resnik also favors the proposal that the court make all meetings between the judge and parties
a part of the court record. Id. at 433-34.
159. See supra note 4 and accompanying text (discussion of controversy surrounding judicially
encouraged settlements).
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